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SUBSCRIPTIONS TO CHARITABLE

AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AS DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS ESTATE -

Decedent had promised to contribute funds to numerous educational, religious,
and charitable institutions. Some of these pledges were conditioned on pledges
of third parties to perform certain duties or to furnish subscriptions to equal
amounts. In several instances the institutions, on fullfillment of the conditions,
acted in reliance on these promises in a manner that made them enforceable
against the estate under the state law. The executor had paid some of these
claims. In affirming the Board of Tax Appeals/ the court held that pledges,
though later satisfied by the executor, cannot be deducted from the gross estate
as "transfers" to charities as provided in section 303 (a) (3) of the Revenue
Act of 1926.2 But because there is no requirement that the consideration be
paid into the decedent's estate, those subs-criptions conditioned on promises of
third parties are proper deductions as claims against the estate when the conditions are satisfied under section 303 (a) (1). 3 Taft v. Commissioner of

1 Taft v. Commissioner, 33 B. T. A. 671 (1936). This report gives a more
complete analysis of the facts than does the report in the immediate case.
2 44 Stat, L. 9 (1926): "For the purpose of the tax the value of the net estate
shall be determined-(a) In the case of a resident, by deducting from the value of
the gross estate••• (3) The amount of all bequests, legacies, devises, or transfers,
to or for the use of ••• any corporation organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, literary or educational purposes...•"
8 44 Stat. L. 9 (1926): "For the purpose of the tax the value of the net estate
shall be determined-( a) In the case of a resident, by deducting from the value of the
gross estate ••• (I) ..• claims against the estate ••• to the extent that such claims •••
were incurred or contracted bona fide and for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth. • • ."
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Internal Revenue, (C. C. A. 6th, 1937) 92 F. (2d) 667,4 a:ffd. (U.S. 1938)
58 S. Ct. 891.
Congress has sought to encourage philanthropy by allowing as deductions
from the gross estate of the decedent the amount of the contributions so made.
The Revenue Act of 1918 granted deductions for such "bequests, legacies,
devises, or gifts." 5 In the present act Congress, apparently intending deductions of a more generous scope, has substituted the broad nontechnical term,
"transfer," for the legally defined term, "gift." 6 But the courts, taking a
lexicographical definition of "transfer," have held that a promise to contribute
is not a deduction as it is but a step preliminary to the actual transfer.7 By the
immediate case, payments after death, though in satisfaction of a subscription,
are not deductible though the statute literally applies to transfers made at any
time. The result of reading in this qualification is that practically the only
transfers deductible under the statute are gifts. This seems to be overlooking
the change made in the statute.8 However, there is still the possibility of claiming a deduction on a pledge paid by the executor ~n the ground that it is a
claim against the estate. The Revenue Act of 1918 allowed deductions for all
enforceable claims.9 But to prevent evasion of the tax through disposition of
the estate in satisfaction of claims supported by a technical consideration, the
Revenue Act of 1 926 makes the additional requirement that the claim be "for
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth." 10 This change
raises the issue as to just how much more than a technical consideration is necessary to constitute a claim within the statute.11 Some authorities, though not all,
maintain that the tenor of this section makes it applicable only to ''financial
bargains." 12 There is also doubt as to whether detrimental reliance by the
recipient of benefits, such as constitutes promissory estoppel, is sufficient con4

This case is noted in 24 VA. L. REv. 453 (1938).
40 Stat. L. 1057, § 403 (a) (3) (1919).
6
See note 2, supra. This section of the statute is discussed in 3 CCH FEDERAL
TAX SERVICE 4984, 1f 3531 (1938).
1
Glaser v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) 69 F. (2d) 254.
8
MoNTGOMERY and MAGILL, FEDERAL TAXES ON EsTATEs, TRUSTS, G1FTS 242
(1936).
9
40 Stat. L. 1057, § 403 (a) (1) (1919). The Revenue Act of 1924 required
that the claims be incurred "for a fair consideration in money or money's worth."
43 Stat. L. 253, § 303 (a) (1) (1924).
10
See note 3, supra. This section is discussed in 3 CCH FEDER,\L TA'X: SERVICE
4959, 1f 3503 (1938). It should be noticed that the statute does not require payment
by the estate. Commissioner v. Straus, (C. C. A. 7th, 1935) 77 F. (2d) 401.
11
This problem is present in many situations beyond the scope of this note.
Where marriage is the consideration, see Union Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B. T. A.
296 (1931); Empire Trust Co. v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) 94 F. (2d)
307. This latter case also involves the release of dower as consideration. A promise
not to contest a will is not a sufficient consideration to satisfy the statute. Latty v.
Commissioner, (C. C. A. 6th, 1933) 62 F. (2d) 952. Nor can the defense be
waived. United States v. Mitchell, (C. C. A. 7th, 1934) 74 F. (2d) 571.
12
See the cases cited in note 11, supra. A deduction has been sustained for a loss if
a bona fide business transaction. Carney v. Benz, (C. C. A. 1st, 1937) 90 F. (2d)
5
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sideration.13 This doubt is probably due to the ease in showing such reliance and
thereby evading the statute. But contributions by third persons in reliance on
the decedent's promise have been held sufficient to support the deduction though
the estate is in no way enlarged.14 This rule seems within the literal phrasing
of the statute and is further justified in that such a consideration would seem to
minimize the possibility of claims made for the purpose of evading the tax.
Charles E. Nadeau

747. The approach of this case was on the basis of whether or not it might be an
attempted disposition of property in the decedent's estate.
13 The immediate case holds such reliance insufficient. See Commissioner v.
Bryn Mawr Trust Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1936) 87 F. (2d) 607; Porter v. Commissioner,
(C. C. A. 2d, 1932) 60 F. (2d) 673, and affirmed without discussion as to this point
in 288 U.S. 436, 53 S. Ct. 451 (1933).
14 Mcllhenny v. Commissioner, 22 B. T. A. 1093 (1931). Also see United
States v. Fourth Nat. Bank, (C. C. A. 10th, 1936) 83 F. (2d) 85, 107 A. L. R. 793
at 801, where the deduction is objected to on the ground that it is too contingent
to be valued.
Turner v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 3d, 1936) 85 F. (2d) 919, 107 A. L. R.
1468 at 1471, permitted a deduction without stating reasons. It is admitted to be
in conflict with the immediate case. The annotation deals specifically with the problem
presented in this note.

